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Abstract: Modern economies are prone to persistent increases in debt and recurrent financial
crises. We present a systems and control perspective on two hypotheses which aim to
explain these dynamics: 1. the growth imperative—which investigates the conditions under
which capitalist economies necessarily exhibit growing debt; and 2. the financial instability
hypothesis—which proposes mechanisms underlying the tendency of capitalist economies to
experience financial crises.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Modern economies are prone to persistent increases in
debt and recurrent financial crises. We present a systems
and control perspective on two hypotheses which aim to
explain these dynamics: the growth imperative and the fi-
nancial instability hypothesis. These hypotheses indicate a
need for greater regulation of the monetary system in order
to constrain this growth in debt. As argued by Turner
(2016), we expect this will require financial reforms which
are more radical than those which have been implemented
since the 2008 financial crisis. In the years since 2008
(commonly referred to as the great recession), there has
been persistent low growth in most developed economies,
despite record lows in interest rates and the attempts
of quantitative easing and other measures to stimulate
growth. These measures are considered necessary to pre-
vent economic stagnation, yet they serve to encourage
further increases in debt levels, inequality, and asset prices
(such as real estate), and they support continued trade
imbalances between countries. But rising debt, inequality,
asset prices, and trade imbalances are among the key
causes of the 2008 financial crisis (see Turner, 2016). Thus,
despite an initial reduction in private debt levels in western
economies following the crisis, there has been a significant
increase in national debt levels, and in the debt levels of
other economies (notably China). Moreover, private debt
levels in the UK are projected to rise above pre-crisis level
by 2020 (Turner, 2016, p. 86).
The application of control theory to the design of sta-
bilising economic policies dates back to the 1950s, and a
comprehensive survey of applications is provided in Neck
(2009). A key point we wish to emphasise in this paper
is the importance of the role of the lending decisions of
financial institutions on the economy. Indeed, as argued
in Graziani (1990), “in any macroeconomic model banks
and firms can never be merged into one single sector”. In
this paper, we analyse two hypotheses which indicate the
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destabilising effect of an unregulated financial sector: the
growth imperative and financial instability hypotheses.
2. THE GROWTH IMPERATIVE
The growth imperative hypothesis seeks to explain the em-
pirical evidence of increasing debts in capitalist economies.
One proposed mechanism underlying a growth imperative
is provided by the so-called A plus B theorem (see Douglas,
1933). This formalises the idea that, if all money is created
with an equal amount of debt, and there is a persistent
removal of money from circulation, then a non-contracting
economy necessarily exhibits growing debts.
A more detailed model exhibiting this phenomenon ap-
peared in Binswanger (2009). This provided a discrete time
dynamical system model of a simple monetary economy in
which households, firms and banks are assumed to spend
their income once in every period. All money is created
through loans, which is a reasonable assumption for mod-
ern economies as the printing of new paper money is a very
small proportion of the total money supply. Some money
is removed from circulation at each instance by banks
retaining a proportion of the interest payments received.
This last assumption is justified in Binswanger (2009) on
empirical grounds, by comparing the increase in banks’
reserves relative to the increase in loans in the US and
Germany from 1979 to 2003. 1 Under these assumptions,
Binswanger (2009) showed that a strictly positive growth
rate is then necessary in order for firms to break even.
The model in Binswanger (2009) contains six parameters:
(i) r: fraction of profits reinvested by firms, 0<r<1;
(ii) c: fraction of loans spent on investment, 0≤c≤1;
(iii) d: depreciation rate, 0<d≤1;
(iv) b: fraction of interest paid as bankers’ wages, 0≤b<1;
1 Note, however, that it is important to distinguish between banks’
reserves (which is money held by banks and so not circulating in
the economy), and banks’ capital (which includes equity and certain
bonds which enable the bank to absorb losses). An increase in banks’
capital need not restrict lending, and there is a strong case for raising
banks’ capital to debt ratios to reduce the fragility of the monetary
system (see Admati and Hellwig, 2013).
(v) z: interest on loans, z>0;
(vi) w: growth rate of loans.
As will be shown, the strict inequalities are crucial to
establishing the growth imperative. These parameters de-
termine the behaviour of ten economic variables, which
vary with the time instance t in accordance with the
following ten relationships:
Lt = (1 + w)Lt−1, (1)
Πt = Ct −WCt−1 − Zt−1 − dKt−1, (2)
Kt = (1− d)Kt−1 + It, (3)
Dt = (1− r)Πt−1, (4)
It = rΠt−1 + cLt, (5)
WCt = (1− c)Lt, (6)
Zt−1 = zLt−1, (7)
WIt = It, (8)
WBt = bZt−1, (9)
and Ct = Dt +WCt +WIt +WBt. (10)
Binswanger (2009) justifies these relationships as follows:
(a) Equation (1) represents a constant rate of change in
the total amount of loans (L).
(b) Only firms in the consumption goods sector are ex-
plicitly modelled, and (2) equates these firms’ profits
(Π) to the difference between their income (equal
to consumption in the present period, C) and their
costs (due to the present levels of wages WC, interest
payments Z, and capital depreciation dK).
(c) Capital (K) depreciates at a constant rate, and is
replaced by investment (I) in accordance with (3).
(d) All loans are to firms in the consumption goods sector,
whose expenditure is on dividends (D), wages, capital
investment, and interest payments, in accordance
with (4)–(7).
(e) Firms in the investment goods sector are neglected,
with spending on investment being completely recir-
culated into the economy as wages from the invest-
ment goods sector (WI), in accordance with (8).
(f) A fraction of interest payments is recirculated into
the economy as bankers’ wages (WB) following (9).
(g) Given the assumption that households spend their
income once in every period, then the consumption in
the present period is given by (10) as the sum of firms’
dividends and the wages from firms, the investment
goods sector, and banks.
As will be discussed later, some issues with this model
were raised in Gila´nyi (2015); Johnson (2015), but those
papers did not fully resolve these issues (see Binswanger,
2015). Our main contribution in this section is to highlight
a fundamental inconsistency in this model, and to propose
and analyse a model which resolves this inconsistency.
First, we analyse the growth imperative exhibited by the
system in (1)–(10).
From (4)–(10), we find that D, I,WC,Z,WI,WB, and
C are determined given Π,K and L, and their values
in period t are non-negative whenever Π,K and L are
non-negative in periods t− 1 and t. Then, by eliminating
C,WC,Z and I from (1)–(3), we obtain:[
Πt
Kt
Lt
]
=
[
1 −d w + c− z(1− b)
r 1− d c(1 + w)
0 0 1 + w
][
Πt−1
Kt−1
Lt−1
]
. (11)
With the notation
A11 :=
[
1 −d
r 1− d
]
, and A12 :=
[
w + c− z(1− b)
c(1 + w)
]
, (12)
then 1+w is an eigenvalue of the matrix in (11), as are the
eigenvalues of A11. But it is easily shown that all of the
eigenvalues of A11 lie inside the unit circle. Accordingly, if
the economy is non-contracting, then w ≥ 0. We then let
zt :=
[
Πt
Kt
]
−
[
w2+w(d+c(1−d)−z(1−b))−dz(1−b)
w2+dw+dr
w2c+w(c+r)+r(c−z(1−b))
w2+dw+dr
]
Lt,
in which the rightmost vector is equal to ((1 + w)I −
A11)
−1A12, and we obtain[
zt
Lt
]
=
[
A11 0
0 1 + w
] [
zt−1
Lt−1
]
=
[
At11 0
0 (1 + w)t
] [
z0
L0
]
.
Since both of the eigenvalues of A11 have modulus less
than 1, then At11 → 0 and zt → 0 as t→∞. This implies
Lt = (1 + w)
tL0 for t = 1, 2, . . . ; and
Πt → w
2+w(d+c(1−d)−z(1−b))−dz(1−b)
w2+dw+dr (1 + w)
tL0,
Kt → w
2c+w(c+r)+r(c−z(1−b))
w2+dw+dr (1 + w)
tL0,
as t → ∞. Thus, in the long run, all variables grow at
the rate 1 + w (this was stated without formal proof in
Binswanger (2009)). By noting that Kt → (rΠt + c(1 +
w)Lt)/(w + d) as t → ∞, it follows that, if L0 > 0, then
a necessary and sufficient condition for the economy to be
non-contracting with non-negative long run values for all
economic variables is for w ≥ 0 to satisfy:
w2 + w(d+ c(1− d)− z(1− b))− dz(1− b) ≥ 0. (13)
Since −dz(1 − b) < 0, then w = 0 implies Πt < 0 as
t → ∞. Thus, w must be greater than or equal to the
(strictly) positive root of the quadratic expression in (13)
for firms to make a non-negative profit in the long run.
It can be shown that some of the special cases d = 0,
z = 0, b = 1, r = 0 or r = 1 do permit firms to break
even in the long run without the requirement for a strictly
positive growth rate of loans. The cases b = 1 and z = 0
were noted in Binswanger (2009), since in these cases the
banks recirculate all interest payments as bankers’ wages.
Johnson (2015) queried several of the relationships (1)–
(10), and proposed an alternative set of relationships.
Again, it was found that a strictly positive growth rate in
loans was required in order for firms to break even in the
long run. Many of the amendments proposed in Johnson
(2015) related to the timings of various payments in (1)–
(10). For example, it was proposed that (2) be replaced by
Πt = Ct−WCt−Zt−dKt−1. But, as argued in Binswanger
(2015), these timings are dependent on the nature of
the business, and (2) is justified on an assumption that
production takes one time instance. Also, altering the
timing assumptions caused only a very small change to the
growth imperative. It is concluded in Binswanger (2015)
that there is little reason to prefer the timing assumptions
in Johnson (2015) to those in Binswanger (2009).
A more fundamental query in Johnson (2015) concerns
firms’ expenditure. Equations (4)–(6) specify that the sum
of dividend, investment and wage payments by firms in
a given period is equal the sum of firms’ profits from
the previous period and the total amount of loans in the
current period. It is claimed in Johnson (2015) that Lt in
these equations should be replaced by the change in loans
Lt−Lt−1. But, given the assumption in Binswanger (2009)
that during one period, households, firms, and banks spend
their income once, then the expenditure of firms should
reflect the monetary balance of their bank accounts. As
we discuss next, it is our contention that neither model is
consistent with this assumption,
In response to Johnson (2015), Binswanger (2015) claims
that his model is consistent with Keynes’ notion of the
revolving fund of finance, whereby a constant amount of
loans finances a constant level of spending (this concept
is formalised in Keen (2009)). But a key feature of the
model in Binswanger (2009) is that money is consistently
removed from circulation and replaced by new loans. In
particular, there isn’t a constant revolving fund of finance,
and the total amount of loans exceeds the money supply.
Since households spend their income once in each period
(see assumption (g) on page 2), then changes in the money
supply can be identified with changes in the monetary
balance of firms’ bank accounts (M), which in one period
is equal to the change in loans plus the difference between
firms’ income and expenditure in that period, i.e.:
Mt = Mt−1+Lt−Lt−1+Ct−Dt−It−WCt−Zt−1. (14)
Then, rather than the sum of dividend, investment and
wage payments by firms being equal to the sum of firms’
profit and the total amount of loans, it is more consistent
to set these equal to the sum of firms’ profit and the
monetary balance of firms’ bank accounts. In other words,
(5)–(6) should be replaced by the relationships:
It = rΠt−1 + cMt, (15)
WCt = (1− c)Mt. (16)
From (4), (7)–(10), and (15)–(16), D, I,WC,Z,WI,WB,
and C are determined given Π,K,M and L, and their
values in period t are non-negative whenever Π,K,M and
L are non-negative in periods t−1 and t. Then, eliminating
C,WC,Z, I and D from (1)–(3) and (14) gives:ΠtKtMt
Lt
 =
1 −d c w − 2z(1− b)r 1− d c c(w − z(1− b))0 0 1 w − z(1− b)
0 0 0 1 + w

Πt−1Kt−1Mt−1
Lt−1
 . (17)
We note initially that, if w = 0, then from the final two
rows of (17), we obtain Lt = L0 andMt = M0−tz(1−b)L0.
In this case, for Mt ≥ 0 as t→∞ we require Lt = 0 for all
t. There is then a constant money supply in the economy
equal to M0. If, on the other hand, w 6= 0, then[
1 w − z(1− b)
0 1 + w
]t
=
[
1 w−z(1−b)w ((1 + w)
t − 1)
0 (1 + w)t,
]
so, from the final two rows of (17), we obtain
Mt = M0 − w−z(1−b)w L0 + w−z(1−b)w (1 + w)tL0, (18)
and Lt = (1 + w)
tL0. (19)
Thus, if w < 0, then Lt → 0 and Mt → M0 − (w − z(1 −
b))L0/w as t → ∞, so for a non-negative long run money
supply we require M0 ≥ (w−z(1−b))L0/w. It can then be
shown that, if the initial money supply M0 is sufficiently
large, then no growth imperative exists. If, however, all
money is created through loans (i.e., M0 = 0 and L0 > 0),
then for Mt to be non-negative as t→∞ we require w ≥
z(1 − b). In fact, this growth imperative was established
in Gila´nyi (2015) using a different method which did not
seek to resolve the inconsistencies in Binswanger (2009).
However, as we will now show, the model we propose here
results in an even higher growth imperative.
To establish the growth imperative for this model, we let
Aˆ11 :=
[
1 −d c
r 1− d c
0 0 1
]
, and Aˆ12 :=
[
w − 2z(1− b)
c(w − z(1− b))
w − z(1− b)
]
.
Here, Aˆ11 has one eigenvalue at 1, and the remaining two
eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle. We let
zˆt:=
[
Πt
Kt
Mt
]
−

w2+(d+c(1−d)−2z(1−b))w−z(1−b)(2d+c(1−d))
w2+dw+dr
rw(w−2z(1−b))+c(w2+w+r)(w−z(1−b))
w(w2+dw+dr)
w−z(1−b)
w
Lt,
in which the rightmost vector is equal to ((1 + w)I −
Aˆ11)
−1Aˆ12, and we obtain[
zˆt
Lt
]
=
[
Aˆ11 0
0 1 + w
] [
zˆt−1
Lt−1
]
=
[
Aˆt11 0
0 (1 + w)t
] [
zˆ0
L0
]
.
We recall that Mt, Lt are as in (18)–(19), and we find that
Aˆt11 →
[
0 0 0
0 0 cd
0 0 1
]
as t→∞; so
Πt → w
2+(d+c(1−d)−2z(1−b))w−z(1−b)(2d+c(1−d))
w2+dw+dr (1+w)
tL0,
Kt → rw(w−2z(1−b))+c(w
2+w+r)(w−z(1−b))
w(w2+dw+dr) (1+w)
tL0
+ cd (M0 − w−z(1−b)w L0),
as t→∞. In particular,
Kt → d(rΠt+c(1+w)Mt)+c(1−d)(wM0−(w−z(1−b))L0)d(w+d) ,
as t → ∞, so Kt is non-negative for large t whenever Πt
and Mt are. Thus, for firms to make a non-negative profit
in the long-run, the following inequality must hold:
w2+(d+c(1−d)−2z(1−b))w−z(1−b)(2d+c(1−d))≥0. (20)
By letting w = z(1 − b) in the quadratic expression in
(20), we obtain −z(1− b)(d+ z(1− b)), which is negative.
It follows that, if the initial money supply M0 is zero (but
L0 > 0), then a necessary and sufficient condition for the
economy to be non-contracting with non-negative values
for all economic variables in the long run is for w to be
greater than or equal to the positive root of the quadratic
expression in (20). For the values c = 0.4, d = 0.1, z = 0.1
and b = 0.8 used in Binswanger (2009), this gives a growth
imperative of 2.5%, in contrast to the figure of 0.45%
obtained in that paper (see equation (13)).
As emphasised in Binswanger (2015), there are many im-
portant aspects of modern economies which are not cap-
tured in this model. In particular, it does not include the
effects of household savings (e.g., for retirement), house-
hold borrowing (e.g., for the purchase of real estate), and
inequality. Also, the precise timings proposed in the model
can be disputed, although it appears the growth impera-
tive is robust to such timing assumptions (see Binswanger,
2015, p. 658). As argued in Keen (2009), continuous time
modelling is a better framework for resolving such timing
issues. Nevertheless, there is a compelling intuitive argu-
ment that if all money is created through interest-bearing
loans, and some money is removed from circulation on a
continual basis, then there will be a tendency for loans
(and consequently debts) to grow in time. That said, it
is important to note that this growth imperative follows
from the assumption that money is continually removed
from circulation. The mechanism proposed in Binswanger
(2009) which removes money from circulation is due to
banks retaining a proportion of interest payments received,
and the growth imperative is not present in the model if
banks recirculate all interest payments as bankers’ wages.
Thus, the mechanism for removing money from circula-
tion enters as an (empirically justified) assumption in the
model in Binswanger (2009), but is likely to occur if it is in
the interest of the institutions who control this mechanism.
This could be explored further using dynamic game theory,
as is advocated for other applications to economic policy in
Neck (2006, 2009). For example it would be interesting to
investigate if growing debts are a feature of a Stackelberg
equilibrium solution (see Neck, 2006) for a hierarchical
dynamic game in which households aim to maximise utility
(balancing leisure with consumption) in response to firms
(who set salaries, prices, etc. to maximise profit); and
where both households and firms borrow in response to the
lending decisions of banks (who set the interest rate and
the proportion of money recirculated to maximise profits
given the optimal response of firms and households).
Also, the model in Binswanger (2009) is linear, and so
it can only exhibit a narrow range of behaviours. In
particular, it is incapable of modelling phenomena such as
financial crises, which are the concern of the next section.
3. THE FINANCIAL INSTABILITY HYPOTHESIS
In Keen (1995), a nonlinear dynamical model of financial
instability was presented, which was inspired by an earlier
verbal model described by the economist Hyman Minsky.
This model includes an exponentially growing population
(N) with exponentially growing productivity (a):
a = a0e
αt and N = N0e
βt,
The labour force (L) is then equal to the product of the
population and the employment rate (λ); national income
(Y ) is the product of the labour force and productivity;
and capital (K) is a fixed ratio (ν) of national income. I.e.,
L = λN, Y = aL and K = νY.
The average wage (w), debt level (D), and aggregated
profits (Π) satisfy
Π = Y − wL− rD,
where r is the interest rate. These variables evolve in
accordance with the following three differential equations:
dw
dt = g1(λ)w,
dK
dt = h1
(
Π
K
)
Y−γK and dDdt = rD+dKdt −Π,
where g1 and h1 are monotonically increasing functions,
with g1(λ) → ∞ as λ → 1; and γ is the rate of
capital depreciation. The first equation represents the
greater ability of workers to demand higher wages as the
employment rate rises. The second represents the role
of expectations in determining investment, as a higher
current profit level encourages more investment in the
expectation of future profits. The final equation assumes
that debt (together with profits) is used only to finance
investment and make interest payments.
Keen (1995) also defined the non-dimensional parameters:
pi = ΠY and d =
D
Y ,
whereupon it is straightforward to show that all variables
are determined given λ, pi, and d (together with the con-
stants a0, N0, α, β, ν, γ and r, and the functions g1 and h1).
Also, with the notation g2(pi) := h1(pi/ν)/ν; and
f1(λ, d, pi) := λ(g2(pi)− α− β − γ),
f2(λ, d, pi) := rd− pi + (g2(pi)− γ)(ν − d),
and f3(λ, d, pi) := (1− rd− pi)(α− g1(λ))
− r(rd− pi + (g2(pi)− γ)(ν − d));
then dλdt =f1(λ, d, pi),
dd
dt=f2(λ, d, pi) and
dpi
dt =f3(λ, d, pi).
This model was simulated in Keen (1995) for different
interest rate regimes. Our main contribution in this section
is to provide a local stability analysis to explain the results
of those simulations. It is easily verified that this model
has an equilibrium point (λe, de, pie) where g1(λe) = α,
g2(pie) = α+β+γ and de = ((α+β)ν−pie)/(α+β−r). The
local stability of this equilibrium point can be determined
from the characteristic polynomial p(s) of the Jacobian
matrix for this system at (λe, de, pie). We note that
∂f1
∂λ =
∂f1
∂d =
∂f2
∂λ = 0 and
∂f2
∂d
∂f3
∂pi =
∂f2
∂pi
∂f3
∂d at (λe, de, pie), so
p(s) = s3 + p1s
2 + p2s+ p3 where
p1 = −(∂f2∂d +∂f3∂pi )λe,de,pie = α+β−r+r( pie−rνα+β−r dg2dpi pie−1)
p2 = −(∂f1∂pi ∂f3∂λ )λe,de,pie
= λeν
dg2
dpi pie
dg1
dλ λe
(α+β)(1−pie−νr)−r(1−2pie)
α+β−r ,
p3 = (
∂f1
∂pi
∂f2
∂d
∂f3
∂λ )λe,de,pie
= λeν
dg2
dpi pie
dg1
dλ λe
((α+β)(1−pie−νr)−r(1− 2pie)).
By the Routh Hurwitz test, the equilibrium (λe, de, pie) is
locally stable if p2, p3 > 0 and p1 > p3/p2. Since λe > 0
and g1 and g2 are monotonically increasing functions, then
the local stability of the equilibrium holds if r > 0 satisfies
r < α+ β,
r(1− 2pie + ν(α+ β)) < (1− pie)(α+ β),
and r(ν dg2dpi pie − 1) < pie
dg2
dpi pie
− (α+ β).
For the values in Keen (1995) (α = 0.015, β = 0.035, γ =
0.02, ν = 3, g1(λ) = 0.0000641/(1 − λ)2 − 0.0400641
(0 ≤ λ < 1), and g2(pi) = 0.0175/3(0.53 − 2pi)2 − 0.065/3
(pi < 0.265)), we obtain λe = 0.966 and pie = 0.139. As the
interest rate r is increased from zero, all three inequalities
initially hold, and the third inequality is the first to fail, at
r = 0.0452. The most striking feature of the model is the
behaviour of the system above this threshold (see Fig. 1).
After some initial large oscillations, λ and pi both exhibit
relatively small oscillations about the equilibrium values
λe and pie for an extended period of time, while the debt to
output ratio rises at a relatively constant rate. However,
this is then followed by oscillations of rapidly increasing
amplitude, accompanied by an acceleration in the rate of
growth of the debt to output ratio. A similar behaviour is
also observed if there is a variable interest rate of the form
r = ζ + φd, for sufficiently large φ (see Keen, 1995). The
model thus demonstrates that a period of relatively benign
economic behaviour, accompanied by a growing debt to
output ratio, can be followed by financial crisis, even in the
absence of external shocks to the system. Keen (1995) goes
on to show that the introduction of a government sector,
which employs a countercyclical taxation and spending
policy, can prevent instability. The resulting economic be-
haviour instead exhibits persistent cycles. However, Keen
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Fig. 1. Simulation of financial instability. Here, r = 0.048,
λ(0) = 0.9, d(0) = 0.2 and pi(0) = 0.04.
(1995) also queried whether Western governments were
taking sufficient measures in this regard.
4. SYNTHESIS, IMPLICATIONS AND
CONCLUSIONS
The focus of this paper was the monetary dynamics of
capitalist economies: the proliferation of debt and the
tendency towards financial crises.
The growth imperative hypothesis formalised the intuitive
notion that, if all money is created by loans, and there is a
persistent removal of money from circulation, then a non-
contracting economy necessarily exhibits growing debts.
Our main original contribution was to resolve a modelling
inconsistency in Binswanger (2009), and to establish a
higher growth imperative than that paper (which was
noted in Binswanger (2009) to be considerably below
the average growth rate of the world economy in recent
decades). The growth imperative relies crucially on the
consistent removal of money from circulation: it remains
to establish what mechanisms are principally responsible
for this. Empirical evidence was provided in Binswanger
(2009) to support the mechanism proposed in that paper
(banks retaining a proportion of interest payments), but
it may be the case that factors which are not included
in that model are more important (e.g., rising house
prices). Regulation of these factors provides one approach
to constraining the growth in debt. To transition to lower
debt levels, overt money creation (creation of money
without a corresponding debt) may also be required (see
Turner, 2016). By directly considering the money supply,
our model can easily be extended to consider this.
The financial instability hypothesis indicated the possibil-
ity for the debt to output ratio to increase considerably
despite otherwise benign economic conditions (as in the
years prior to the 2008 financial crisis). Financial fragility
was seen to increase with the debt to output ratio, which
ultimately led to crisis. Here, our main original contribu-
tion was a local stability analysis which explained the sim-
ulation results in Keen (1995). The hypothesis indicates a
need for greater control over the debt to output ratio as
opposed to other metrics (for example, the prevalence of
inflation targeting by central banks).
While this paper has focused on closed economies (i.e.,
with no imports or exports), it is important to recognise
that the most damaging effects of debt proliferation are on
open peripheral economies. As emphasised in Wolf (2015),
the most vulnerable economies are those which are unable
to raise finance denominated in their own currency, due
to either insufficient investor confidence or participation
in a currency union (e.g., the Eurozone). Such economies
are unable to devalue or overtly create their own currency
to alleviate their debt, and can be forced to focus on
exporting at the expense of the domestic economy. There
are considerable opportunities for the systems and control
community to contribute to the analysis and modelling of
these issues. The importance of the effective control of the
monetary system to the functioning of the economy, and
the persistent features of rising debt and financial crises in
modern economies, provide ample motivation for this.
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